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INTERSTATE BANKING: MYTH AND REALITY
H. Rodgin Cohen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent legislative, judicial and economic developments have intensi-
fied the debate over whether long-standing federal limitations on inter-
state banking should be liberalized or even eliminated. The debate over
interstate banking, however, suffers from two basic flaws.
First, the terms of the debate are not understood. The issue is not
whether interstate banking should exist. Comprehensive interstate bank-
ing already exists in a variety of forms. Yet, the existence of interstate
banking does not mean that the debate is irrelevant. Rather, the specific
question for debate is whether financially healthy banking organizations1
should be permitted to merge or acquire one another without regard to
state boundary lines.
Second, the debate over interstate banking has not been placed in a
proper historical perspective. Congress dealt with interstate banking in
1927, 1933, 1956 and, to a limited extent, in 1982. A review of the con-
gressional debates reveals that Congress' three principal concerns were
economic concentration, bank safety and soundness, and competitive
equality. The interstate banking debate has failed to focus on whether
these concerns remain relevant today and how, if relevant, they should
now be addressed.
Only when the terms of the debate are understood is it possible to
analyze properly the advantages and disadvantages of legislative action
liberalizing the restrictions on interstate banking. Only when past con-
gressional objectives and perceptions are recognized is it possible to de-
termine whether and how those objectives remain relevant today. It is
the thesis of this Article that legislative liberalization of interstate bank-
ing is supported by a reexamination of both the existing interstate bank-
ing structure and the congressional rationale behind the current statutory
restrictions.
* Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York. B.A., 1965, Harvard University; L.L.B.,
1968, Harvard University.
1. For purposes of this Article, the term "banking organizations" refers to both banks
and bank holding companies.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Background
1. Federal legislative structure
The federal legislative restrictions on interstate banking consist pri-
marily of: (1) a prohibition on interstate branching; 2 and (2) a restriction
on interstate bank acquisitions.3
The federal branching prohibitions, popularly referred to as the Mc-
Fadden Act, were adopted in 1927 and modified in 1933. 4 Congress'
objectives in originally adopting the McFadden Act have been misunder-
stood. Focusing on the enactment of 12 U.S.C. section 36, which in 1927
permitted national banks to branch only within a single city, some com-
mentators have viewed the McFadden Act as restricting national bank
branching. Other commentators have argued that the 1927 McFadden
Act was intended to expand branching power in view of a 1924 Supreme
Court ruling that national banks lacked any branching authority.'
Both of these views are incorrect. The principal focus of Represen-
tative McFadden in 1927 was not on national bank branching, but in-
stead on the absence of any restriction on branching by state banks.
Consequently, the more critical provision of the McFadden Act was the
amendment of section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act 6 to restrict branching
by state banks which were members of the Federal Reserve System.
Congress had two objectives in enacting the McFadden Act in 1927.
The first was to prevent undue economic concentration.8 The second
was to prevent state banks from having a substantial advantage over na-
tional banks by reason of their then broader branching power.9 At the
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 355 (1982).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
There are also a wide variety of state law limitations on interstate banking. See, e.g., N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 200 (McKinney 1980); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 105 (Purdon 1967 &
Supp. 1984-1985). Although the constitutionality of these state statutes has apparently never
been challenged in a judicial forum, the landmark Supreme Court case on interstate banking
expansion creates at least a significant question on the constitutionality of these statutes under
the commerce clause. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
5. See First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982).
7. S. REP. No. 666, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); 68 CONG. Rac. 2166 (1927) (state-
ment of Rep. McFadden).
Although the McFadden Act applies only to banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System, the opportunity for interstate expansion by nonmember banks has apparently
never been utilized.
8. 66 CONG. REc. 1649-50 (1925) (statement of Rep. McFadden).
9. H.R. REP. No. 583, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1926).
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same time, the potential of any advantage for national banks was negated
by confining their limited branching authority to that permitted for a
state bank.10
In the seminal Banking Act of 1933,11 the McFadden Act was
amended to permit national banks to expand on a statewide basis to the
extent permitted for state banks. This amendment represented a com-
promise between the Senate and the House. In 1932, the Senate had
passed a bill12 which would have permitted statewide branching without
reference to state law and interstate branching within a 50 mile "trade
area." The House was strongly opposed to any liberalization of the
branching restrictions.
13
The principal objective of the 1933 expansion of branching authority
was the promotion of bank safety and soundness.14  Senator Carter
Glass, the Senate's dominant expert on banking matters, had been a
strong proponent of the 1927 branching limitations. He subsequently
became convinced, by the ensuing closing of thousands of banks, that his
original views were incorrect. Stressing the correlation between restric-
tions on branching and the magniture of. bank closings, he urged ex-
panded branching powers as a solution. 5 The Senate opponents of
expanded branching authority based their arguments on concern over
economic concentration.' 6
The compromise decision to confine branching expansion to state
borders was unaccompanied by any detailed analysis of why the state,
rather than a larger or smaller geographic area, was appropriate. There
was no indication that Congress regarded the state as an economic unit.
Indeed, an historical analysis would demonstrate that state boundary
lines were not drawn for such purpose, much less to follow the demands
of banking customers. The determination may well have been influenced
by the fact that in 1933 only two banks had multi-state branches.7
10. 68 CONG. REc. 2166 (1927) (statement of Rep. McFadden).
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1982). This Act was popularly known as the Glass-
Steagall Act. It also contained provisions establishing the federal deposit insurance program
and the separation of commercial and investment banking.
12. S. 4412, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
13. The Senate bill was misinterpreted by a number of congressmen as permitting full
interstate banking with state aquiescence. 76 CONG. REc. 1333 (1933) (statement of Sen.
Wheeler).
14. S. REP. No. 79, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
15. 75 CONG. REc. 9890 passim (1932); 76 CONG. REc. 1405 (1933) (statement of Sen.
Glass).
16. S. REP. No. 584, Part II, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (minority views); 75 CONG.
REC. 10,055 (1932) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
17. The two banks with multi-state branches, which predated the 1927 McFadden Act,
1985]
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The federal limitations on interstate banking through bank acquisi-
tions were established by section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956.18 Section 3(d) is popularly known as the Douglas Amendment.
It generally provides that the Federal Reserve Board may not approve an
application by a bank holding company to acquire a bank located outside
the holding company's principal state of operations. 9 The Douglas
Amendment does, however, authorize individual states to authorize ac-
quisitions by out-of-state bank holding companies.20 In contrast, there is
no authority under the McFadden Act for states to authorize interstate
branching.
The Douglas Amendment represented a compromise between a
House bill, 21 which contained a flat bar on interstate acquisitions, and a
Senate bill,22 which contained no limitation. Although the legislative de-
bates contain several references to state rights, Senator Douglas made it
clear that his Amendment was intended to check undue bank
concentration.23
Both proponents and opponents of the Douglas Amendment as-
sumed that it was unlikely that states would authorize out-of-state entry.
This assumption proved to be accurate for the first twenty-five years fol-
lowing the Douglas Amendment. In the last three years, however, a
number of states have authorized out-of-state entry.24
were Heritage Bank (of New Jersey) with a branch in Philadelphia and Bank of California with
branches in Oregon and Washington. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Federal Reserve Board) has sought to preclude these interstate branches from being used as a
vehicle for further interstate expansion. See, eg., Mellon Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 441
(1984), affd sub nom. Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1984);
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 518 (1984).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
19. This limitation on the Federal Reserve Board's authority is tantamount to a prohibi-
tion because all bank acquisitions (except bank mergers) must be approved by the Board under
§ 3(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). Interstate bank merg-
ers would normally violate the McFadden Act. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
20. The types of state statutes which are permissible under the Douglas Amendment and
the nature of the state action required have been the subject of numerous judicial and regula-
tory actions. Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985); Iowa Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d
1288 (D.C. Cir.), cer denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); First Bank Sys., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 771
(1984); Bank of New York Co., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 527 (1984); Mellon Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed.
Res. Bull. 441 (1984), affd sub nor. Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F.2d 838 (3d
Cir. 1984); NCNB Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982).
21. H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
22. S. 2577, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
23. 102 CONG. REc. 6857 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
24. Two states, Alaska and Maine, have authorized entry on an unlimited basis; one state,
New York, has authorized entry on a "reciprocal" basis; eight states, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland, have author-
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The existing federal structure has not been comprehensively reexam-
ined by Congress in almost thirty years. The Douglas Amendment was
amended in 1982 by Title I of the Garn-St Germain Act25 to provide for
interstate acquisitions of failed banks which had at least $500 million in
assets. Congress adopted this revision in order to provide stability to the
banking system.26
2. Existing forms of interstate banking
Notwithstanding this pervasive legislative pattern, interstate bank-
ing has become a fundamental element of the banking industry. "The
McFadden-Douglas wall remains intact, but market forces are surging
around and over it."'27 Such a result is seemingly inevitable because the
"financial services industry is inherently an interstate business.128 To
some extent, the existing interstate banking structure reflects conscious
legislative decisions. To an even greater extent, the structure reflects
technological, regulatory and economic changes which Congress has not
confronted.
a. section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act
The principal source of interstate banking is section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act,29 which permits bank holding companies
and their subsidiaries to engage in activities which are "so closely related
to banking . . . as to be a proper incident thereto."30 The Douglas
Amendment restrictions apply only to interstate acquisitions of
"banks." 31 In contrast, section 4(c)(8) contains no geographic limitation
ized entry on a "regional reciprocal" basis; and two states, Kentucky and Rhode Island, have
authorized entry on a "regional reciprocal" basis with a "national reciprocal" trigger. In addi-
tion, several states, e.g., Delaware, have authorized out-of-state acquisitions of credit card or
limited wholesale banks, several, e.g., Iowa, have enacted special grandfather statutes, and
several, eg., Illinois, have authorized acquisitions of failing banks.
25. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
26. See Capital Assistance Act and Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 2531 and S. 2532, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 122 (statement of Hon. C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency), 168 (statement
of Roger W. Mehle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (1982).
27. Special Issue: Interstate Banking, ECON. REv., May 1983, at 2 (Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta).
28. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T OF THE TREAs., GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S REPORT].
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
30. Id.
31. The term "bank" is defined in § 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
1985]
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on expansion by bank holding company subsidiaries which are not
"banks," even if these subsidiaries provide substantial banking services.
Somewhat surprisingly, Congress does not appear to have consid-
ered the question of whether there should be geographic limits on bank
holding subsidiaries other than banks. Prior to the 1970 amendments to
the Bank Holding Company Act,32 the Federal Reserve Board generally
restricted expansion by nonbanking subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies to the state in which the holding company was principally located.33
Although the present section 4(c)(8) was substantially rewritten in the
1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, 34 the congres-
sional debate focused on whether the revision expanded the range of per-
missible activities rather than where the activities could be performed.35
Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve Board evidently interpreted the
1970 amendments as eliminating geographic restraints.36 Subsequent
state efforts to limit expansion under section 4(c)(8) have been held to be
unconstitutional.37
Acting under section 4(c)(8), a number of large bank holding com-
panies have been able to establish a national presence for lending and
other financial services. There is approximately one interstate section
4(c)(8) office for every six bank branches.
The principal method of geographic expansion has been through ac-
quisition of finance companies. In the early and mid-1970's the Federal
Reserve adopted a restrictive policy on such acquisitions on competitive
grounds.38 Under the Federal Reserve's most recent decisions, however,
virtually no finance company acquisition would be denied on competitive
grounds. 39 There are now approximately 6000 interstate offices of bank
holding company finance company subsidiaries. Other major forms of
geographic expansion under section 4(c)(8) have been in mortgage bank-
§ 1841(c) (1982), as a company which both: (1) accepts demand deposits; and (2) engages in
the business of making commercial loans.
32. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843,
1849, 1850 (1982)).
33. See General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260 (1958).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
35. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-22 (1970) with S. REP. No.
1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1970).
36. The Federal Reserve did not articulate a rationale for this reversal of position. See
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular No. 6677 at 3 (1971).
37. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1981); Continental Illinois Corp. v.
Lewis, No. 81-944 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 1983).
38. See Chase Manhattan Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 874 (1974) (not allowing acquisition of
Dial Finance).
39. See Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull 452 (1984) (approving acquisi-
tion of CIT Financial).
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ing (approximately 700 interstate offices), leasing, trust services, insur-
ance, and industrial banks.
Prior to 1984, the Federal Reserve Board had been generally unwill-
ing to approve section 4(c)(8) subsidiaries which engaged in retail de-
posit-taking.4 Limited exceptions were made for industrial banks and
failing thrift organizations. The Federal Reserve's stated reason for this
position was a possible conflict with the policy of the Douglas
Amendment. 41
In March, 1984, however, the Federal Reserve opened the door to
interstate retail deposit-taking under section 4(c)(8) by approving the
first "nonbank bank" subsidiary of a bank holding company.42 Since
that date, applications have been filed for over 300 nonbank bank
charters.43
Interstate subsidiaries established under section 4(c)(8) have been
primarily the province of the largest bank holding companies. All of the
ten largest bank holding companies and 48% of the fifty largest have
such subsidiaries, but only about 1% of the bank holding companies be-
low the top 150 have such subsidiaries.' Not surprisingly, these subsidi-
aries are concentrated in the most attractive banking markets, with
California, Florida and North Carolina ranking as the top three states in
terms of such subsidiaries.
b. loan production offices
Many larger banks operate so-called loan production offices (LPOs)
on an interstate basis. These offices are not branches in violation of the
McFadden Act because the loans are considered to be "made" from the
home office.45 The offices do, however, actively solicit loan business from
40. See D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280 (1977) (denying application to acquire
savings and loan associations). '
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
42. U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371 (1984). A nonbank bank is an institution
with a bank charter, but which is not subject to the Douglas Amendment because it is not
defined as a "bank" under § 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act. Id. at 372. See supra
note 3 1.
43. The feasibility of the nonbank bank has been thrown into question by a recent decision
holding that the Comptroller of the Currency lacked the authority to charter such an institu-
tion and the Federal Reserve Board's determination not to process additional applications in
light of this decision. IBAA v. Conover, No. 84-1403 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1985); Federal
Reserve Board, Press Release (Mar. 15, 1985).
44. See Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, EcoN. REv., May 1983, 4, 9
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
45. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.20, 250.141(h) (1985). Under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1982), a branch
"include[s] any. . . office. . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent."
Various procedural arrangements, relating among other things to credit approval and funds
1985]
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larger and, increasingly, medium-sized companies. It is estimated that
there are now approximately 375 interstate loan production offices.
The establishment of loan production offices does more than gener-
ate loan business. The establishment of an interstate loan production of-
fice to develop corporate loan relationships "has usually meant that
[corporate] deposits also have flowed interstate.46
c. Edge corporations
Edge corporations have been established under section 25(a) of the
Federal Reserve Act47 to provide international banking services. There
are no geographic restrictions on Edge corporations, and expansion was
encouraged by a 1979 liberalization of the Federal Reserve Board's regu-
lations governing Edge corporations. 48 There are approximately 150 in-
terstate offices of Edge corporations, the great majority of which are
owned by the largest banking organizations.
d. grandfathered bank holding companies
The Douglas Amendment did not affect the status of then existing
multi-state bank holding companies. 49 Four of these grandfathered hold-
ing companies have more than 900 interstate offices. The largest, First
Interstate Bancorp, which is headquartered in California, has deposits of
approximately $20 billion in banks located in ten other states. Under a
series of judicial decisions, these grandfathered bank holding companies
have been permitted to expand, through bank mergers, in the states in
which they had banks prior to 1956.50
e. automated teller machines
Numerous automated teller machines (ATMs) have been established
which permit, on a shared basis, access to out-of-state deposit accounts
for both withdrawals and deposits. In describing the growth of interstate
ATM systems, one commentator noted that: "[E]lectronic funds transfer
disbursement, are followed to preserve this distinction. There has been no conclusive judicial
determination of the status of LPOs under the McFadden Act. See Independent Bankers
Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
46. Eisenbeis, Interstate Banking Federal Perspectives and Prospects, in BANK STRUURE
AND COMPETITIONS 174 (1981) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago).
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1982).
48. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-211.602 (1985).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
50. See, e.g., South Dakota v. National Bank of South Dakota, 219 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D.
1963), affid, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1964); Leuthold v.
Camp, 273 F. Supp. 695 (D. Mont. 1967).
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defies geographic boundaries."51 There are an estimated 100 interstate
ATM systems.
Under a series of judicial decisions, an ATM is considered to be a
McFadden Act "branch" of the bank which owns it.5 2 It was recently
confirmed, however, that an ATM is not a branch of a bank which does




Through calling programs, larger banks provide loan and deposit
services to businesses and institutions throughout the country. It is not
possible to estimate the magnitude of business generated by calling of-
ficers. Nonetheless these programs, combined with loan production of-
fices and telephonic and electronic communications, have established a
truly national banking market for larger businesses and institutions.
g. retail solicitation programs
A number of larger banking organizations actively solicit retail loan
and deposit business on an interstate basis. On the lending side, the prin-
cipal focus is on credit cards. Interstate business is obtained by both
direct mailings and purchases of credit card portfolios from other banks.
Retail deposits are solicited through brokers. Such programs were made
feasible by 1980 legislation which provided for the phasing out of interest
rate ceilings on deposits of under $100,000. 54
h. an analogy
The distortion created by this existing system of interstate banking
can perhaps be best summarized by an analogy. Assume that grocery
chains were only permitted to expand interstate under the same limita-
tions as banking organizations. Grocery chains would then generally be
prohibited from establishing new stores out-of-state and acquiring stores
in other states. On an interstate basis, they would be limited to: (1) ac-
quiring or establishing butcher shops, delicatessens, cheese stores, green
51. Frodin, Electronics: The Key to Breaking the Interstate Banking Barrier, Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1982, 3, 11 (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
52. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1981).
53. Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, Nos. 84-7424
& 84-7448, slip op. at 2248 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 1985).
54. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, tit. II & III, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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grocers and bakeries (the equivalent of the section 4(c)(8) laundry list);
(2) acquiring or establishing stores which sold only ethnic foods, such as
Mexican, Chinese, etc. (the equivalent of Edge corporations); (3) selling
to large purchasers such as restaurants, schools and hospitals (the
equivalent of national wholesale banking); (4) acquiring large grocery
chains which had failed (the equivalent of Title I of Garn-St Germain);
and (5) for a limited number of grocery chains, acquiring or establishing
additional stores in states where they had been in operation before the
restrictive legislation was enacted (the equivalent of the Douglas Amend-
ment grandfather provisions).
B. The Issue of Concentration of Banking Services
The legislative history of the McFadden Act and the Douglas
Amendment establishes that the primary objective of these congressional
restrictions was the prevention of excessive concentration of banking
services." The continued relevance of this concern, however, is open to
serious question.
1. Absence of existing concentration
Even if the banking organizations alone are considered, the banking
industry is remarkably unconcentrated. Based on domestic deposits, the
largest bank has only a 3.7% national market share and the ten largest
banks have a 14.8% collective national market share. Furthermore, dur-
ing the past fifty years, concentration in the banking industry has been
declining. In 1935, the largest banking organization held approximately
4.3% of domestic deposits and the ten largest banking organizations held
approximately 24% of domestic deposits.5 6
These statistics, however, vastly exaggerate the extent of concentra-
tion in the banking services industry. As has been increasingly recog-
nized by bank regulators, economists and commentators, banking
organizations confront vigorous competition from other financial services
companies for every aspect of the banking business.57
For example, thrift institutions (savings and loan associations, sav-
ings banks and credit unions) have achieved a virtual powers parity with
55. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
56. Statistics compiled from FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, SUMMARY
OF ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS IN ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS (1935 & 1983). See generally
Glassman & Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies and Concentration of Banking Financial Re-
sources, in THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM (1978).
57. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 2; National City Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 743
(1984); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Decision on the Application of Peoples
National Bank of Central Pennsylvania (Nov. 5, 1984).
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banks as a result of federal and state legislation.58  Thrift institutions
hold deposits equal to 50% of commercial bank domestic deposits.
Money market funds, spawned by the high interest rate environment
in the late 1970's and the then-existing restrictions on interest rates paya-
ble on bank deposit accounts, also compete. These funds, which offer a
meaningful alternative to bank deposit accounts, hold funds equal to
14% of commercial bank domestic deposits.
Another competing service, commercial paper, has become the pri-
mary source of short-term funding for major corporations. Commercial
paper represents 49% of bank commercial and industrial loans.
A number of financial conglomerates, including Sears Roebuck,
American Express and Merrill Lynch, offer virtually a full range of bank-
ing services on a national basis. It is estimated that each of these compa-
nies generates revenues from banking services which would rank it
among the fifteen largest banks. These companies have been described as
having a "potential impact ... on the financial markets [which] is
enormous."
59
A number of the nation's industrial and retail companies offers loans
and other financial services through finance subsidiaries or directly.
These include General Motors, Ford Motor, General Electric, J.C. Pen-
ney and K-Mart. Each of the first three companies has more loans than
the sixteenth largest banking organization; the first two would rank sec-
ond and eleventh, respectively.
Other competitors for bank services include: insurance companies
for bank loans and certain deposit services; broker-dealer cash manage-
ment accounts for bank deposits; and various investment advisors and
mutual funds for bank trust services.
If banking organizations have been able to retain 50% of the market
for bank services, a percentage which appears high,' ° then the largest
banking organization would have only a 1.85% national market share
and the ten largest only a collective 7.4% share. Such concentration is
far less than that held by other retail organizations. The largest broker
has an estimated 15% market share (based on commissions for listed
58. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 103(b)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 132, 133 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); Thrift Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1496 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54B-195 (1982).
59. Gart, The Financial Conglomerates, ECON. REv., May 1983, at 21 (Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta).
60. A recent Administration study found that banking organizations hold only 35% of
private financial assets. VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM:
THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 17 (1984).
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securities); the ten largest have over a 50% market share." The largest
life insurance company has an estimated 8% market share (based on pre-
miums); the ten largest have a 32% market share. 2 The largest grocery
chain has an estimated 18% share (based on sales); the ten largest have a
77% market share.6 3
The competition for banking services from companies other than
banks did not exist, and was not anticipated, when Congress adopted the
basic federal limitations on interstate banking. Its existence today calls
into serious question the validity of any continuing concern about exces-
sive concentration.
2. Absence of potential for concentration
Not only is there an absence of existing concentration in the banking
industry, but the potential for excessive concentration would not exist if
the interstate barriers were lowered. A combination of economic, regula-
tory and legal factors precludes massive acquisition programs by the na-
tion's largest banks. It is likely that most interstate combinations will
involve low premium combinations between regional banking organiza-
tions of roughly similar size and relatively modest acquisition programs
by the nation's largest banks.
At the risk of generalization, business combinations in the banking
industry can be divided into two general categories. First, there are ac-
quisitions in which the acquiring company pays a substantial market pre-
mium for the acquired company, and the acquired company's
management thereafter plays little or no role in the direction of the com-
bined entity. Second, there are transactions in which the shareholders of
neither company receive a substantial market premium, and the manage-
ments of both companies play a role in the direction of the combined
entity." Although not technically accurate, the first category will be
referred to an acquisitions, and the second as mergers.
It is unlikely that the nation's largest banking organization would
enter into mergers with smaller banks. As a matter of their own corpo-
rate culture, they are unlikely to accept the management of a smaller
61. Based on figures from LIPPER ANALYTICAL SERVICES, INC., LIPPER-SECURITY IN-
DUSTRIES FINANCIAL ANALYSIS SERVICES (1984) and annual reports.
62. A.M. BEST Co., Busr's INSURANCE MANAGEMEN T REPORTS-LIFE/HEALTH (79th
ed. 1984).
63. Based on statistics from the Food Marketing Institute.




bank in a co-equal role. Moreover, smaller banks are likely to demand a
substantial market premium.
At the same time, there are significant limitations on the capacity of
the nation's largest banking organizations to acquire other banks. A key
limitation is the Federal Reserve Board's capital requirement for acquisi-
tions. As a general policy, an acquiring bank holding company must
have tangible primary capital, on aproforma basis for the acquisition, of
at least 5.5%.6 Under this guideline, most of the nation's largest bank
holding companies would be precluded from large acquisition programs,
as a result of purchase accounting, if the consideration included cash or
debt and therefore resulted in intangible assets such as good will.66
The incurrence of good will could be avoided, and capital ratios im-
proved, if acquisitions were made for stock. However, a second limita-
tion on the nation's largest banks-market conditions-makes large
stock acquisitions impracticable. The stocks of most money center banks
trade at a discount from book value and at a multiplier of about six times
earnings.6 7 In contrast, the stocks of profitable regional bank holding
companies trade at a substantial premium to book value and at a multi-
plier of eight to ten times earnings.68 As a result, the money center banks
could not afford to make a number of large stock acquisitions at premi-
ums consistent with those being paid in the industry without suffering an
unacceptable level of dilution.
Moreover, this market disparity is so substantial that money center
banks could not, in a number of cases, acquire even a single regional
bank. For example, Chase Manhattan is approximately twelve times
larger than Wachovia Corporation in terms of assets.69 Nonetheless, if
Chase sought to "acquire" Wachovia for stock and paid a 75% premium
over Wachovia's current market price, Wachovia's shareholders would
own over 50% of the combined company.
The antitrust laws represent perhaps the most important factor
preventing excessive concentration in the event of liberalized interstate
banking. This factor was not present, or at least not perceived to be pres-
ent, when Congress enacted the McFadden Act and Douglas Amend-
ment. Prior to the United States v. Philadelphia National Bank7" case in
65. National City Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 743 (1984).
66. See generally FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCE-
MENTS, APB 16, at 87 (Aug. 1970).
67. Financial Services Stocks, Am. Banker, Mar. 5, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
68. Id. at 14, col. 1-3.
69. Based on various public filings by Wachovia and Chase Manhattan and closing stock
prices on April 19, 1985, as reported in the Wall Street J., Apr. 22, 1985, § 2, at 38, col. 2, 8.
70. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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1963, it was widely assumed that the antitrust laws did not apply to bank
mergers. Efforts by the Federal Reserve Board to challenge the interstate
expansion by Transamerica under section 7 of the Clayton Act 71 had
proved unsuccessful. 72 As a result, Congress may have viewed geo-
graphic restrictions as the only effective method of preventing excessive
concentration in the banking industry.73
It could be argued that Congress had available another effective
method of halting bank expansion-incorporating the antitrust standards
into federal legislation governing bank acquisitions. Such an approach
had not been adopted in 1927 or 1933, but it was adopted in section 3(a)
of the Bank Holding Company Act.74
The legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act, however,
shows that the geographic restrictions of the Douglas Amendment were
still related to a concern about excessive concentration. Although the
section 3(a) antitrust standards were included in all versions of the legis-
lation, Congress was evidently concerned that this was not sufficient.
There were repeated references to the dominance of Transamerica in the
West and First Bank System and Northwest Bancorporation in the upper
Midwest.75
In point of fact, Congress' concern may well have been appropriate.
Interstate acquisitions would normally be subject to challenge on anti-
trust grounds only under a potential competition doctrine. There was of
course no precedent on how this doctrine would have been applied to
banks. Moreover, at the time the Douglas Amendment was enacted, the
very concept of potential competition had not yet been judicially
accepted. 6
Although no bank acquisition has yet been barred as a result of a
potential competition challenge, the application of this doctrine to the
banking industry is undeniable.77 Furthermore, in the two most recent
decisions relating to bank potential competition, the courts articulated
standards and procedures for determining whether and how this doctrine
71. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
72. See, eg., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
73. Senator Glass attempted, at one point, to argue that the regulatory approval process
for bank branches would check excessive concentration, but this view was not endorsed by
others. 75 CONG. REc. 9898 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
75. See 102 CONG. RIc. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
76. Cf United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).




Accordingly, the antitrust laws, as now developed and explicated,
should serve to check the undue concentration which the geographic bar-
riers were designed to prevent. If there remains a concern that antitrust
laws are not sufficient to accomplish this purpose, it would be possible to
deal with this concern by a less draconian and more direct method than
an absolute ban on interstate banking. For example, there could be a
prohibition on acquisitions if the acquiring bank holding company's do-
mestic deposits exceeded a designated percentage of total domestic de-
posits. On the state level, there are already limitations in a number of
states on the aggregate percentage of state deposits which can be con-
trolled by a single banking organization.7 9 As one senior Federal Re-
serve official has written: "Banking is not now highly concentrated, so
there is time to explore alternatives for policies governing [interstate]
mergers." 80
As late as 1956, congressional concern over potential domination by
the money center banks was largely untested. The limited available evi-
dence suggested that such a danger might exist. Multi-state bank hold-
ing companies such as Transamerica, Northwest and First Bank System
had assumed major positions in several states. These states were, how-
ever, for the most part small rural states, and the large market shares of
these out-of-state holding companies were frequently due to the financial
collapse of independent banks prior to meaningful out-of-state entry.81
Since passage of the Bank Holding Company Act, New York has
provided an ideal laboratory for testing congressional concern over
money center bank domination. In 1960, New York enacted legislation
which paved the way for statewide banking.82 Five of the nation's seven
largest banking organizations are in New York; 3 if interstate banking
would produce excessive concentration, it should have occurred in New
York.
In point of fact, the passage of statewide banking legislation in New
York did not result in statewide domination by the money center banks.
78. Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981); Mer-
cantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. See, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-345 (West 1984).
80. Billington, Bank Deregulation and Concentration-What Policy for Mergers?, ECON.
REV., Nov. 1983, at 6 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City).
81. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S
880, S. 2350, H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (statement of J. Cameron Thompson), 381-
83 (statement of Frank N. Belgrano, Jr.) (1955) [hereinafter cited as BHC Act Hearings].
82. Omnibus Banking Act, 1960 N.Y. Laws ch. 237.
83. Am. Banker, Jan. 31, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
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During the 1960-1983 period, the total market share held by the three
largest banking organizations actually declined from 40% to 39%.84 In
the same period, the larger upstate banking organizations and smaller
New York City banks were able to increase their market share. During
this period Key Banks' statewide market share increased from 0.4% to
1.3%, Norstar's market share from 0.8% to 1.7%, and Bank of New
York's market share from 1.4% to 3.6%.5
If the major money center banks did not come to dominate banking
in New York, it is highly unlikely that they would achieve dominance on
a national scale. New York is a considerably smaller unit than the na-
tion, in terms of both population and geography. Moreover, the New
York City banks had long experience in and substantial familiarity with
their own state.
The result in New York is consistent with numerous studies which
indicate that small banks can compete effectively with larger bank en-
trants. 6 In large measure, this occurs because economies of scale do not
appear to be present above a very small size bank.87
Additional empirical evidence on the pattern of business combina-
tions in an interstate environment is provided by the experience in the
two state-created interstate banking regions. 88 Purportedly acting under
the state authorization clause of the Douglas Amendment, three states in
New England and five states in the Southeast have established regions for
interstate expansion.89
In New England, the first announced interstate transaction involved
the second and sixth largest organizations (CBT and Bank of New Eng-
land Corporation) and a no-premium merger.90 The dominant banking
organization in New England, Bank of Boston, has agreed to make two
acquisitions, but they involve only the tenth and twelfth largest organiza-
84. Federal Reserve Board, Call Data for All Commercial Banks in the United States (July
30, 1984); FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, BANKING STUDIES DEPARTMENT.
85. FEDERAL RESERVE BAIK OF NEW YORK, BANKING STUDIES DEPARTMENT.
86. See S. RHOADES, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK MERGER POLICY OF FINANCIAL
DEREGULATION, INTERSTATE BANKING, AND FINANCIAL SUPERMARKETS, STAFF STUDIES
137 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board); E. KOHN, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS (Dec. 1966)
(New York State Banking Dept.).
87. Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructuring and
Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 435, 452 (1982).
88. There has not, however, yet been sufficient experience to make a definitive assessment.
89. The constitutionality of these state statutes has been challenged. Northeast Bancorp v.
Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
90. See Carson, Conn., Mass Banks Announce Big Interstate Merger Plan, Am. Banker,
June 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
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tions (RIHT and Colonial).91 The first interstate transaction in the
Southeast involves a no-premium merger between the fourth and ninth
largest banking organizations (Sun Banks and Trust Company of
Georgia).
3. Increased concentration created by the present system
The argument against continuation of interstate restrictions as a
check on excessive concentration goes well beyond the conclusion that
these restrictions are no longer necessary. Indeed, it appears that the
present structure fosters rather than prevents concentration. This occurs
at both the state and the national levels.
When Congress earlier debated the interstate issue, banking in most
states was unconcentrated. Only ten states then permitted statewide
branching, and multibank holding companies within a single state were
relatively rare.9z
In the last twenty-five years, this situation has changed drastically,
due to both legislative and regulatory developments. On the legislative
side, there are today only a handful of states which do not permit state-
wide banking (in branch or holding company form or both). On the reg-
ulatory side, there has been substantial relaxation in the competitive
standards applied by the federal banking agencies, particularly the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.93 In the past three years, the federal bank regulatory
agencies have approved, and the Justice Department has not challenged,
mergers involving two of the five largest banking organizations in New
Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Florida,
Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, Oklahoma and Nebraska. 94 Between 1966 and
91. See Fraust, Banks Stake Out an Interstate Future, Am. Banker, Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, col.
2.
92. See 75 CONG. REc. 9986 (1932). Nonetheless, as early as 1932, Senator Glass recog-
nized that the continuation of geographic restrictions created monopolistic tendencies in local
markets. 75 CONG. REc. 9892 (1932); 76 CONG. REc. 1405 (1933).
93. This change appears due in part to the Justice Department's more lenient guidelines on
horizontal mergers, Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, 2 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4500 (1984), and, of even more importance, to a recognition that thrift institutions
compete with commercial banks. National City Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 743 (1984).
94. FIRST JERSEY NAT'L BANK, 3 COMPTROLLER CURRENCY Q.J. No. 4, at 83 (1984);
CONN. BANK & TRUST Co., 2 COMPTROLLER CURRENCY Q.J. No. 2, at 66 (1982); VA. NAT'L
BANK, 3 COMPTROLLER CURRENCY Q.J. No. 1, at 161 (1983); LIBERTY NAT'L BANK, 2
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY Q.J. No. 1 at 120 (1983); Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Decision on the Application of First Nat'l Bank of S.C. (1984); National City Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 743 (1984); First Chicago Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 351 (1984); Banks of Mid-
Am., Inc., 70 Fed. Res. Bull, 460 (1984); Omaha Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 447 (1984);
Sun Banks, Inc., 69 Fed. Res. Bull, 939 (1983); Mellon Nat'l Corp. 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 302
(1983).
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1982, the three largest banks in Florida acquired a total of 124 banks,
and four large Texas bank holding companies acquired a total of 153
banks.95
As a result, concentration has increased dramatically in many states.
For example, in the last five years the market share of the three largest
banks has increased from 13% to 32% in New Jersey and from 8% to
38% in Florida.96
Only the advent of liberalized interstate banking is likely to check
this pronounced trend toward increased concentration at the state level.
Interstate banking would relieve the pressure for intrastate mergers by
providing alternative expansion outlets. It would also introduce new
competitors into the state markets. Pure logic dictates that states which
are attractive for entry will have additional competitors if existing barri-
ers to entry are removed.
On a national level, Congress in .1927, 1932-33 and 1956 repeatedly
expressed its concern about the domination of the banking industry by a
small number of money center banks.97 Yet, it is the present interstate
system Which is responsible for the small number of money center banks
with a national presence. As discussed above, under the present system
there is interstate banking, but it can be accomplished only in an abnor-
mal manner. This system provides a substantial advantage to the largest
and most financially powerful banking organizations; only they can af-
ford the inherent inefficiencies and risks. A more rational system of in-
terstate banking, permitting normal merger and acquisition activity,
would increase the potential for multiple banks with a national presence.
The nation's largest bank holding companies have taken advantage
of the present system to assume an increasingly national presence. Cit-
icorp, the largest bank holding company, has utilized the Gain-St
Germain provisions (and the prior similar policy of the Federal Reserve
Board) to acquire large troubled retail depository institutions in the key
markets of Illinois, Florida and California.9" Citicorp's Edge corpora-
tion has branches in twelve states. Its consumer finance and mortgage
95. S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1960.83, Staff
Studies No. 142 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board).
96. These levels far exceed the levels of national concentration which are likely to occur if
interstate banking is liberalized. For example, when BankAmerica acquired the largest bank
in Washington and the 18th largest bank in the country, SeaFirst, its national market share
increased by only 0.6% to 3.7%. BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 568 (1983). If
BankAmerica were to acquire the 25th, 35th, 45th, 55th and 65th largest banking organiza-
tions, a practical impossibility, its national market share would increase to only 5.5%.
97. S. REP. No. 584, Part II, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1932).
98. Citicorp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 149, 157 (1984), 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 554 (1983).
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subsidiaries have hundreds of interstate offices. It has LPOs in virtually
every major city.
A small number of other giant banks have also been able to engage
in major interstate expansion under the present system. BankAmerica,
the second largest bank holding company, was able to acquire the domi-
nant bank in Washington.99 BankAmerica already has a national con-
sumer finance chain with 195 offices in 43 states. Its Edge corporation
subsidiary has branches in ten states and would rank as the country's
sixtieth largest bank." ° Manufacturers Hanover, the fourth largest bank
holding company, recently achieved an immediate national presence
through the acquisition of CIT's 313 offices in 44 states.1"'
The impact of this expansion-through-exception process is illus-
trated by a statistical comparison. In 1970, the largest banking organiza-
tion was $17 billion larger than the fifth and $21 billion larger than the
tenth.12 Today, the comparable figures are $86 billion and $111
billion.
10 3
Moreover, these statistics may actually understate the increasing
disparity. Citibank has a substantial retail banking presence in four of
the nation's major banking markets. No other bank has such a presence
outside its home market. Citibank has approximately 800 out-of-state
offices, approximately 200 of which are desposit-taking (based on total
Citicorp/Citibank/COIC domestic offices as of December 31, 1984);
BankAmerica has 415 out-of-state offices, 195 of which are deposit-
taking. 104
Analysis suggests that the present system has created this disparity
and will continue to increase it. Banks other than Citicorp would obvi-
ously want to enter such markets as California and Florida. They lack,
however, the financial resources to accept the losses involved in restoring
a failing savings and loan association to profitability. They also lack the
managerial resources required to undertake such a task. Manufacturers
Hanover just barely had sufficient size to acquire CIT.1 5 For a smaller
bank holding company, it would have been out of the question. A major
bank holding company, other than BankAmerica, expressed an interest
in acquiring SeaFirst. It was told by the Federal Reserve that
99. See BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 568, 570, 571 (1983).
100. Am. Banker, Oct. 24, 1984, at 28.
101. Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 452, 452-53 (1984).
102. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, BANKING STUDIEs DEPARTMENT.
103. Am. Banker, Jan. 31, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
104. Interview with Rich Beede, Bank of America Public Relations Department (Jan. 29,
1985).
105. Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 453-54.
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BankAmerica was a preferable acquiror because its substantially greater
size would enable it to endure unexpected losses.
Only through a more rational interstate banking structure will it be
possible to reverse this trend whereby national banking is the province of
only a handful of the very largest banking organizations. If banking or-
ganizations could engage in normal interstate merger and acquisition ac-
tivities, there would be the potential for a number of other national
competitors. It is widely accepted that there ultimately will be full inter-
state banking. Unless this occurs in the relatively near future, the largest
banking organizations will have established such a commanding lead
under the present system that other banking organizations will be unable
to become effective nationwide competitors.
C. The Issue of Bank Safety and Soundness
In 1984, the banking industry experienced its most serious financial
problems since the depths of the Great Depression. Seventy-nine banks
failed, the most since 1938. For the first time in this century, one of the
nation's ten largest banks, Continental Illinois, would have failed but for
massive government intervention. The FDIC's list of problem banks
skyrocketed to 817. All ten of the largest quarterly losses ever posted by
United States banks occurred in 1983 and 1984.
In view of these developments, the potential impact of interstate
banking on bank safety and soundness must be analyzed both in terms of
individual banks and the banking system as a whole. If there is a mean-
ingful possibility that interstate banking would enhance bank safety and
soundness, this is a powerful, if not irrefutable, argument for interstate
banking.
This analysis properly begins with a historical perspective. Twice,
in the McFadden Act in 1933 and in Garn-St Germain in 1982, Con-
gressly modestly reduced the restrictions on bank geographic expansion.
As discussed above, in both cases the motivation was bank safety and
soundness. Thus, Congress is on record as being willing to liberalize in-
terstate banking limitations to promote bank stability. Moreover, the
largest existing multistate bank holding companies were established, in
substantial part, in response to the banking crisis in the late 1920's to
early 1930's.106
In more recent times, the largest and most spectacular collapse of a
bank was that of Continental Illinois in 1984. Commentators have at-
tributed the collapse to Continental's lack of liquidity, the poor quality of
106. BHC Act Hearings, supra note 81, at 311, 318-20.
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its loan portfolio and lack of diversification. 10 7
All of these problems could be attributed to legal restrictions on geo-
graphic expansion. With respect to liquidity, Illinois' unit banking provi-
sion effectively precluded Continental from access to "core" deposits.
Although automated teller machines and other technological advances
have diminished the importance of proximity to retail deposit taking, nu-
merous studies have demonstrated the importance of convenience in ob-
taining core deposits. 10 Continental's single office in the Loop could not
provide this convenience. 0 9
A closely related advantage of an expanded geographic presence
would have been the opportunity for Continental to establish a meaning-
ful retail banking business.110 Such a business may have provided an
earnings cushion to shelter Continental's mistakes in commercial lend-
ing. It may also have provided an opportunity for Continental to have
satisfied its desire for growth without undertaking the more risky aspects
of its commercial loan expansion.
At the heart of Continental's problems was the poor quality of its
loan portfolio. The most serious problems resulted from participations in
loans made by Penn Square National Bank, large loans to secondary par-
ticipants in the oil and gas industry and foreign loans to marginal private
credits. The one common denominator of these loans, other than their
poor quality, was their distance from Continental's home office.
There is not necessarily a correlation between the distance of a bor-
rower from the home office and the soundness of the loan. Nonetheless,
it is likely that a bank will be less familiar with a borrower which is at a
distance, and less familiarity inherently involves greater risk. The bank
will be less knowledgeable about the specific borrower and the area's
economy. The bank will be less capable of policing the loan on an ongo-
ing basis.
It is of course possible that Continental would have made its poor
loans irrespective of its ability to expand geographically. Yet it is likely
that Continental would have had fewer problems if it had been able to
107. See Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 1984: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17 (1984)
(statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
108. See Riggall, A New Study: How Newcomers Select Banks, A.B.A. BANKING J., July
1980, at 92.
109. The importance of access to core deposits should not, however, be exaggerated.
Although Continental was an aggravated case, the relative importance of core deposits at
many money center banks has been steadily declining.
110. See Sinkey, The Characteristics of Large Problem and Failed Banks 11 (Aug. 29-30,
1984) (unpublished manuscript) (delivered at Bank Administration Institute program).
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purchase a bank in Oklahoma or Texas, as opposed to relying on partici-
pations purchased from Penn Square. Stated differently, Continental
would have been in a better position to achieve a quality loan portfolio if
its growth plans could have been channeled into acquisitions of healthy
banks rather than into loans far removed from its home base.
Although a concentration of lending in a bank's natural market area
would improve credit review and control, concentration could also create
serious problems if the natural market does not have a sufficiently diverse
economic base. The banking industry in Texas provides a case in point.
During the 1970's and the early 1980's, banks in Texas were, as a
whole, the strongest in the country. The Texas economy is largely based
on the oil and gas industry, and as this industry expanded rapidly after
the so-called oil shocks, so did bank profitability.
When, however, oil prices collapsed in 1983 and 1984, the profitabil-
ity of many Texas banks plunged as precipitiously. The First National
Bank of Midland, which had almost one billion dollars in deposits,
failed.111 InterFirst, the largest Texas banking organization, lost $249
million in the third quarter of 1983.112 Quarterly losses were also in-
curred by three other large Texas banking organizations.'
13
Such losses were not surprising because the loans of these Texas
banking organizations were heavily concentrated in Texas, and concen-
tration in Texas meant concentration on oil and gas loans. A number of
major Texas banking organizations had oil and gas loans which repre-
sented 20% or more of their total loan portfolios. 4 Moreover, the de-
cline of the energy industry had a ripple effect throughout the entire
Texas economy. The real estate industry was particularly hard hit as
development plans and prices declined. The Texas banks were also large
lenders to the Texas real estate industry.
The decline in the oil and gas industry would have adversely affected
Texas-based banking organizations irrespective of whether geographic
restrictions had previously been liberalized. It is likely, however, that
this negative impact would have been ameliorated if Texas banking orga-
nizations had been able to expand into their natural market regions in the
Southeast.
During the same period in which the Texas economy went into a
tailspin, the economies in states such as Georgia, Florida and the Caroli-
11. Fraust, Texas Bank Stocks Drop After Weekend's Ill News, Am. Banker, Oct. 11, 1983,
at 2, col. 1.
112. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, § 1, at 37.
113. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, § 1, at 41.
114. Review of various annual reports.
[Vol. 18
SYMPOSIUM
nas were booming. If Texas banking organizations had been permitted to
expand into such states, it is likely that the relative proportion of Texas
oil and gas loans would have been reduced. Not only would the losses in
Texas-based lending have been spread over a wider base, but the profits
generated in more profitable economies could have cushioned the losses
suffered in Texas.
An even more serious banking problem may exist today in such ag-
ricultural states as Kansas, Nebraska and Iowa. The economies of these
states are heavily dependent on agriculture, and the decline in prices for
farm products and farm land has created an economic tailspin.
The consequences have been felt directly by the banks in these
states. Because the loans of the banks are concentrated in their home
states, the problems in agriculture have translated into problems in the
banks. In 1984, there were a total of fifteen bank failures in Iowa, Kan-
sas and Nebraska, as compared to a total of eleven failures in the ten
years between 1970 and 1980.111 Many of the larger banks in these three
states have experienced a serious downturn in their earnings or even
losses.
The basic concept here is simple and universally accepted. Diversifi-
cation reduces risk. "To control [credit] risk, the raison d'etre of portfo-
lio theory, diversification, should be followed. Continental, Midland,
Penn Square, and other energy lenders violated this fundamental princi-
ple." '116 Because the vast majority of banking institutions are limited to a
single state, however, their ability to achieve diversification is largely a
function of their state's economic base. If the state's economy is based on
a single industry, the bank's loans and its ultimate profitability will also
be based on that industry.
This problem was recognized as early as 1932 by Senator Glass in
urging expanded branching authority. 11 7 He stressed that in one-crop
states or one-mineral states banks were particularly vulnerable to down-
turns in the local economy. "Two fundamental causes are at the root of
the small bank failures-lack of diversity and necessarily lack of earning
power." 
18
The restrictions on interstate banking are inevitably restrictions on
diversification. These restrictions therefore create greater risk.
115. See Despite Failures, Tennessee Banking System Called Healthy, Am. Banker, Feb. 13,
1985, at 12, col. 1.
116. Sinkey, supra note 110, at 6. See also 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 31.2(b)
(1984).
117. 75 CONG. REc. 9896 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass).
118. Id.
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Title I of Garn-St Germain illustrates one further advantage of in-
creased liberalization of interstate banking. The ability of bank holding
companies to cross state lines could reduce the potential for bank fail-
ures. Strong out-of-state banks, not subject to the vagaries of the local
economy, would be able to acquire financially troubled banks. As dis-
cussed above, it was for this very reason, albeit on an instate basis, that
the federal branching restrictions were liberalized in 1933.119
It is nonetheless indisputable that Gan-St Germain has not served
to avert bank failures. There have been no failing bank acquisitions
under Garn-St Germain.
The reasons for this ineffectiveness are complex, and reflect in part
the limitations contained in the statute. 120 This ineffectiveness, however,
can be eliminated only by a general liberalization of interstate banking,
and not by merely tinkering with Garn-St Germain.
An example of the need for more fundamental reform is illustrated
by the failure of First National Bank of Midland. Despite the economic
problems in the oil and gas industry, Texas is still widely regarded as a
desirable market. 12 1 Yet, when Midland failed, there was no serious out-
of-state bidders. This was undoubtedly because an out-of-state buyer of
Midland would have been confined to a single office in Midland as a
result of Texas' unit banking statute. Although Texas bank holding com-
panies can expand throughout the state through a multi-bank holding
company structure, Gan-St Germain would not have provided a similar
opportunity for an out-of-state acquiror.
Moreover, the vast majority of banks experiencing serious financial
difficulty are relatively small. Garn-St Germain presently limits inter-
state acquisitions to banks with at least $500 million in assets. Even if
this statutory size limitation were removed, a practical impediment to
acquisition would continue to exist.
As a general rule, out-of-state bank holding companies would have
little or no interest in entering a state solely through the acquisition of
small financially troubled banks. If, however, out-of-state banking insti-
119. Id.
120. For example, the requirement that the acquired bank have actually failed discourages
acquisitions. With rare exception, a bank does not fail overnight. The deterioration occurs
over a period of time, during which the value of the franchise diminishes. Major depositors
and borrowers leave and key management departs. The acquiror of a failed bank, therefore,
would frequently acquire only a shell.
121. There have been 33 applications by out-of-state bank holding companies to form non-
bank banks in Texas, more than any other state except Florida. Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Summary of Non-Bank Bank Applications Filed with the OCC (Jan. 22, 1985).
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tutions could acquire healthy larger banks within the state, additional
acquisitions of financially troubled small banks might make sense.
The importance of out-of-state bank holding companies as potential
acquirors is particularly important in those one-industry states where a
decline in that industry adversely affects the entire banking system. In
the agricultural and energy states, the largest bank holding companies
remain solvent, but most are experiencing substantial loan quality
problems. They are in no position to take on the problems of smaller,
more seriously troubled banks.
The recent, and as of yet untested, deregulation of deposit interest
rates creates the potential for additional pressure on bank stability. The
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980122 has transformed a substantial portion of bank funding from a
low, fixed cost or no cost basis to a market variable rate. 123
The potential negative impact of this legislation has been mitigated
by the absence of high interest rates since the deregulation occurred. If
rates increased to the 15-20% level of the 1979-1980 period, the impact
of deposit deregulation could be severe. A number of banks may not
have been able to achieve an asset sensitivity which conforms to their
liability sensitivity. Moreover, even if that asset sensitivity has been
achieved in theory, as a practical matter many borrowers may be unable
to survive if the rates on their loans climbed to such high levels. In such
a scenario, it would be essential that the healthier banks be in a position
to deal adequately with the problem.
D. Other Issues
1. The issue of protecting local banks from competition
Closely related to the congressional concern over concentration was
an intention to protect local banks from competition. A number of the
developments previously discussed, however, have substantially vitiated
the capacity of the McFadden Act and Douglas Amendment to accom-
plish this objective. Local banks now face competition from the section
4(c)(8) subsidiaries and other interstate operations of out-of-state bank
holding companies. Competition also comes from the wide variety of
financial concerns that are not subject to geographic limitations.
Today, even retail customers are increasingly able to obtain financial
122. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
123. This change has not significantly affected some of the money center banks due to their
already heavy reliance on purchased funds.
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services on a nationwide basis through credit card accounts, finance and
mortgage companies, and money market and cash management ac-
counts. Under these circumstances, congressional geographic limitations
designed to protect local banks are increasingly counterproductive. As
pointed out by perhaps the leading economist on the issue of interstate
banking:
The real importance, however, of the money market mutual
funds is that they have served to break down the dependence of
the previously locally limited customers on local depository in-
stitutions . . . . Under such circumstances any benefits that
might have previously accrued to in-state institutions from the
prohibitions on interstate banking-by protecting markets from
entry or the threat on entry from out-of-state banks-are com-
pletely dissipated. In fact, the restrictions now become binding
and have the opposite effect by preventing in-state banks from
operating or competing on the same geographic scope as the
money market funds or the users of financial services.
124
2. The issue of competitive equality
A congressional objective in adopting the McFadden Act and the
Douglas Amendment was competitive equality among banking institu-
tions. In the McFadden Act, Congress was concerned that the branching
powers of state banks and national banks remain equal.12 With respect
to the Douglas Amendment, Congress was concerned that large multi-
state holding companies would enjoy a competitive advantage.' 26
In 1933 and 1956, when there was only minimal interstate banking,
restrictions on all interstate banking promoted competitive equality. At
the present time, however, now that there is substantial interstate bank-
ing, these restrictions have the opposite effect. This is particularly the
case where the system of interstate banking favors the very largest finan-
cial institutions.
As previously discussed, only a handful of large money center banks
have been able to establish a major interstate presence. Their very size
enables them to utilize the existing avenues for interstate banking, while
the risks and inefficiencies involved preclude smaller organizations from
following a similar course. Moreover, the banking industry as a whole is
124. Eisenbeis, supra note 46, at 175-76.
125. 68 CONG. REc. 2166 (1927) (statement of Rep. McFadden).
126. 102 CONG. REc. 6857 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
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at a competitive disadvantage because many of its nonbank competitors
are not subject to any geographic limitation.
The competitive disparity which the McFadden Act and Douglas
Amendment sought to prevent is now the very product of their existence.
Today, liberalization of these restrictions would best accomplish Con-
gress' actual objective.
III. CONCLUSION
Proponents of continued restrictions on interstate banking must jus-
tify a system which is contrary to this nation's fundamental economic
policy-freedom to compete. They must further justify a policy which is
contrary to the basic concept of a single union for economic matters.
Congress, first in 1927-1933 and then in 1956, concluded that re-
strictions on interstate banking were necessary despite such conflicts.
There have been, however, major changes in the ensuing years in the
relevant economic, legal and technological factors, and the concerns
which motivated Congress at an earlier time should therefore be reexam-
ined. Upon analysis, Congress' principal concern-concentration of
banking resources and the necessity of geographic restrictions to prevent
it-no longer appears valid. Moreover, Congress' concerns about safety
and soundness, which were responsible for the modest relaxation of geo-
graphic barriers in 1933 and 1982, support further liberalization.
In the most detailed governmental study of the interstate issue in
recent years, an Administration task force urged liberalization of geo-
graphic restraints on interstate banking.12 7 The task force charged that
the existing system
perpetuates the existing discrimination against the retail cus-
tomer, deprives the public of the benefits of increased competi-
tion, impedes the efficient allocation of resources, retards the
development and application of new technologies, and restricts
the ability of bank management to compete with other, non-
bank financial institutions.
128
Liberalization of interstate banking would be justified if only a small part
of this indictment were accurate.
127. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 2.
128. Id.
1985]

